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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CYNTHIA ANN HUNNICUTT,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48038-2020
Ada County Case No.
CR01-19-32918

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Cynthia Ann Hunnicutt failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of eighteen years with five years fixed following her
conviction by a jury for felony driving under the influence, enhanced as a persistent violator?
ARGUMENT
Hunnicutt Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Officers received a call stating that a driver was swerving and hitting the center divider on

Fairview Avenue in Boise before turning into the parking lot of a bar. (PSI, p. 3.) When officers
arrived, they found Hunnicutt sitting in a car, with its engine running and lights on, parked with
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its front fender making contact with the side of another vehicle. (Id.; Exs., pp. 4-5.) She smelled
of alcohol, the car contained an open can of beer, and an open case of beer, and she admitted she
had consumed alcohol prior to driving to the bar. (PSI, pp. 3-4; Exs., pp. 2-3.) She failed field
sobriety tests and was combative with officers, yelling, swearing, insulting and threatening
officers, and repeatedly slamming her head against the divider between the front and back seats of
the police vehicle. (PSI, p. 4; see,
e.g.,
- - Forbes 4.mp4 23:00 – end; Forbes 3.mp4.) At the jail,
Hunnicutt continued to be combative, hitting her head on the wall and ground. (PSI, p. 4.) She
refused breath testing both at the scene and at jail, and officers at the jail did not pursue a blood
draw due to her combative and aggressive behavior. (Id.)
Hunnicutt was charged with felony driving under the influence of alcohol, with a prior
felony DUI conviction in the previous fifteen years, and with driving without privileges. (R., pp.
42-43.) She was also charged as a persistent violator. (R., pp. 47-48.) Following a trial (R., pp.
65-83), Hunnicutt was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence (R., p. 114). In exchange
for the state’s agreement to dismiss the misdemeanor driving without privileges charge, Hunnicutt
admitted that she had a prior felony conviction for battery on a police officer and a prior felony
conviction, within the previous fifteen years, for driving under the influence. (1/15/20 Tr., p. 277,
L. 7 – p. 278, L. 7; p. 281, L. 9 – p. 286, L. 17.) On the state’s motion, the court dismissed the
misdemeanor driving without privileges charge. (1/15/20 Tr., p. 288, Ls. 3-6.) The district court
ordered a mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 and suggested Hunnicutt be screened
for mental health court. (1/15/20 Tr., p. 286, L. 23 – p. 287, L. 5.)
Prior to sentencing, due to “extraordinary circumstances” resulting from “COVID-19” and
the court’s “extremely reduced calendars,” the matter was reassigned for purposes of sentencing
from the senior judge who presided over trial to another judge. (R., pp. 118-19.)
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At sentencing, the state recommended ten years with three and a half years fixed. (4/9/20
Tr., p. 16, Ls. 15-23.) Defense counsel recommended only that the court impose a period of wholly
indeterminate time, but without specifying any particular period. (4/9/20 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 7-11.) The
district court imposed a sentence of eighteen years with five years fixed, to run concurrently with
the sentence in a separate criminal case. (4/9/20 Tr., p. 29, L. 17 – p. 30, L. 18; R., pp. 122-24.)
Hunnicutt filed a request for leniency under I.C.R. 35, submitting an affidavit from counsel,
a number of letters of support, and a letter stating the she was accepted into a sober living facility.
(R., pp. 147-66.) The district court denied that motion. (R., pp. 169-72.)
Hunnicutt timely appealed from her sentence and from the denial of Rule 35 motion. (R.,
pp. 133-35, 142-46.)
B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). In
evaluating whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part
inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
exercise of reason.” State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
C.

Hunnicutt Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Sentencing Discretion
Whether appealing directly from the initial imposition of the sentence or following the

denial of a Rule 35(b) motion, an appellant arguing that a sentence is excessive must establish that
it was excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170
P.3d 397, 401 (2007); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 660, 978 P.2d 214, 220 (1999). In
3

determining whether the appellant met this burden, the court considers the entire sentence but,
because the decision to release the defendant on parole is exclusively the province of the executive
branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be the period of actual incarceration. State v.
Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) (citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d
at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive, the appellant must demonstrate that
reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing
goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736,
170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary
objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015). The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (holding district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the
objectives of punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for
rehabilitation). “In deference to the trial judge, [the appellate court] will not substitute its view of
a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d
at 628 (quoting Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). “A sentence fixed within the
limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
Hunnicutt was convicted and sentenced for felony driving under the influence, her second
such offense in the previous fifteen years, and a persistent violator enhancement. (R., p. 122.) The
conviction for driving under the influence alone was punishable by up to ten years in prison. I.C.
§ 18-8005(6), (9). With the persistent violator enhancement, it was punishable by up to life in
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prison, and not less than five years in prison. I.C. § 19-2514. Hunnicutt’s sentence was thus wellwithin the statutory limits, and the fixed term was in fact the minimum sentence permitted.
Without addressing―or even citing―the district court’s sentencing discussion, Hunnicutt
argues that the district court abused its discretion. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-11.) She points to a
variety of allegedly mitigating factors that were before the district court and were expressly
considered by it when it imposed the sentence did. (Id.) She has not shown the district court
abused its discretion.
Though the sentencing judge was not the judge who presided over trial, the sentencing
judge stated that she had “reviewed the entire record in this particular case.” (4/9/20 Tr., p. 6, L.
22 – p. 7, L. 19.) The court noted that it reviewed both the PSI and the psychological evaluation
under I.C. § 19-2522. (4/9/20 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 8-14.) The court then acknowledged the applicable
legal standards. (4/9/20 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 7-14.)
As the court noted, Hunnicutt “has a significant history as a repeat offender of the driving
under the influence laws” and, in fact, was under parole supervision for a felony driving under the
influence conviction when the instant offense occurred. (4/9/20 Tr., p. 27, L. 22 – p. 28, L. 2.)
That offense from 2011 was in fact her fourth driving under the influence conviction. (PSI, pp. 57.) In addition to those driving under the influence convictions, Hunnicutt has a raft of other
convictions, including several felonies, many of which involve battery on officers or resisting
arrest. (PSI, pp. 5-7.) As the district court recognized, that aggressive, combative response when
confronted by officers regarding her illegal conduct is a pattern that was repeated in this case.
(4/9/20 Tr., p. 29, Ls. 4-8; PSI, pp. 3-5; Forbes 4.mp4 23:00 – end; Forbes 3.mp4.) While still on
parole for that 2011 conviction, and with a resisting or obstructing arrest charge in the interim,
Hunnicutt did not merely violate her parole conditions by consuming alcohol in this case, but drove
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“a 1500-pound vehicle after she ha[d] consumed alcohol to the point of being impaired” so that
she was “swerving into oncoming traffic and parking in a manner where she was contacting
another vehicle in the parking lot” of a bar, where she presumably intended to consume more
alcohol. (4/9/20 Tr., p. 27, L. 22 – p. 29, L. 8.)
Moreover, as the court recognized, Hunnicutt’s pattern of behavior in this regard was
undeterred by more than a decade of prior efforts at treatment and rehabilitation. (4/9/20 Tr., p.
27, Ls. 22-24; p. 28, Ls. 9-19; p. 29, Ls. 9-12.) Following her third conviction for driving under
the influence in 2008, she was required to take cognitive self-change and alcohol education classes.
(PSI, p. 6.) Very shortly thereafter, she was convicted of injury to a child and disturbing the peace,
and was required to take more alcohol education classes. (Id.) Following more convictions, this
time in Nevada, she was required to undergo more substance abuse counseling in 2009. (PSI, pp.
6-7.) In 2010, she completed a rider in Idaho and, on supervision, briefly “appeared compliant
with the terms of her release.” (PSI, p. 8.) But very shortly thereafter, she was convicted again
for driving under the influence in Idaho, in addition to being convicted in Nevada for attempted
burglary. (PSI, p. 7.) While she was sentenced in Idaho to another rider, she was removed from
the program due to a detainer associated with the Nevada charges. (PSI, p. 8.) Hunnicutt was
released on parole in 2014, but in May of 2018 was convicted of disorderly conduct and resisting
or obstructing officers when she was “observed pounding on the door of a closed business at 1:00
in the morning, and upon being detained she was noncompliant and aggressive.” (PSI, p. 8.)
When released on parole, though she was receiving counseling and substance abuse treatment, she
“admitted she continued consuming alcohol and her motivation to attend counseling and treatment
appeared minimal.” (Id.) She was “unsuccessfully discharged” from behavioral health treatment
in January of 2019, months before the instant offense. (PSI, p. 9.) She was attending intensive
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outpatient treatment twice weekly for seven months prior to her discharge, but acknowledged that
she was “drinking consistently throughout her treatment.” (PSI, pp. 16-17.) According to the
mental health report, she “does not have a plan on how to discontinue her drinking and she seems
to have a belief that she will stop when she eventually wants to stop and she does not know when
that will be.” (PSI, p. 76.)
Hunnicutt’s LSI-R score was in the “high-risk category.” (PSI, pp. 18-19.) The court
expressly recognized that the psychological evaluation reflected mental health conditions and that
Hunnicutt’s risk of re-offense may decrease with treatment, but the court also noted that
Hunnicutt’s criminal history, her history of failing to follow through with treatment and
rehabilitative efforts or to improve her conduct following convictions, and her express
ambivalence about avoiding alcohol was reason for significant concern with respect to the safety
of the community. (4/9/20 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 1-20.) The court expressly recognized that it did not
have to weigh each of the Toohill factors equally, but that the “primary factor” is protection of
society. (4/9/20 Tr., p. 29, Ls. 12-16.) Ultimately, the court determined that the sentence imposed
was necessary for the protection of society, to ensure that Hunnicutt received “correctional
treatment,” in a context where her sobriety could be ensured, and to provide “significant
punishment to deter behavior.” (4/9/20 Tr., p. 27, L. 22 – p. 28, L. 8; p. 30, Ls. 11-15; p. 28, Ls.
15-19; p. 28, L. 25 – p. 29, L. 3; p. 29, L. 17 – p. 30, L. 18.)
Following Hunnicutt’s motion under Rule 35(b), the court acknowledged Hunnicutt’s
arguments regarding “her familial relationship, potential to be a productive member of society,
recognition of her addiction and mental health issues, and participation in programming while
incarcerated,” and stated that it had reviewed the materials filed in support of the motion. (R., p.
171.) While the court stated that it “appreciate[d]” those mitigating factors, they did not justify
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modification of the sentence. (Id.) As the court noted, Hunnicutt “has been on some [form] of
felony supervision for over a decade, yet continues to drive under the influence and endanger the
community with her behavior.” (R., p. 172.) “The Court finds that the Court’s responsibility to
protect the community from Defendant’s crimes, and the importance of deterring the Defendant
from committing additional crimes outweighs rehabilitation in this case.” (Id.)
Hunnicutt’s argument on appeal is simply a request that this Court reweigh the aggravating
and mitigating factors, and reevaluate the district court’s determination regarding the importance
of the goals of sentencing in this case. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-11 (citing the same allegedly
mitigating factors as the district court considered below).) Hunnicutt has failed to show that the
court did not exercise reason simply because it gave less weight to the mitigating circumstances
than she desired. See State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 773, 229 P.3d 374, 378 (2010) (finding no
abuse of discretion upon a weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors in sentencing); State v.
Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 932, 104 P.3d 969, 974 (2005) (emphasizing the discretionary nature of
weighing mitigating and aggravating factors). Nor can she show an abuse of discretion simply by
stating that the district court should have been more concerned with rehabilitation than protection
of society. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, at 965 P.2d at 185 (holding district court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that the objectives of punishment, deterrence and protection of society
outweighed the need for rehabilitation).
In particular, as discussed above, while it is certainly true that Hunnicutt has both substance
abuse and mental health issues, the district court had excellent reason to be concerned with her
ability to address those issues in the community while ensuring the safety of the community. In
addition, the psychological report specifically provided that both substance abuse and mental
health treatment would be available in an incarcerated setting, even if certain forms of mental
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health treatment “may” be unavailable in an incarcerated setting. (PSI, p. 80.) While the report
suggests her risk to the community would be low “if she is able to maintain her sobriety” (PSI, p.
81), it was precisely her ability to maintain her sobriety in the community that the district court
doubted, and for excellent reason. Indeed, though Hunnicutt has a long history of receiving
substance abuse and mental health treatment in the community (PSI, pp. 75-76), she continued her
pattern of criminality and driving under the influence, putting the community at great risk.
Likewise, Hunnicutt’s “personal success and support among her family,” and the fact that she has
taken anger management, money basics, and resume writing classes, for example, provide no
reason to think the district court’s judgement that Hunnicutt presented too great a risk in the
community was objectively unreasonable. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10.)
Because the district court properly considered and applied the goals of sentencing and
weighed the aggravating circumstances against any mitigating information in fashioning
Hunnicutt’s underlying sentence, she has failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 5th day of April, 2021.

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of April, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

AVW/dd

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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